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Abstract: Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are responsible for the automation of different processes
and the overall control of systems that include highly sensitive potential targets such as nuclear
facilities, energy-distribution, water-supply, and mass-transit systems. Given the increased
complexity and rapid evolvement of their threat landscape, and the fact that these systems form part
of the Critical National infrastructure (CNI), makes them an emerging domain of conflict, terrorist
attacks, and a playground for cyberexploitation. Existing layered-defence approaches are increasingly
criticised for their inability to adequately protect against resourceful and persistent adversaries.
It is therefore essential that emerging techniques, such as orthogonality, be combined with existing
security strategies to leverage defence advantages against adaptive and often asymmetrical attack
vectors. The concept of orthogonality is relatively new and unexplored in an ICS environment and
consists of having assurance control as well as functional control at each layer. Our work seeks to
partially articulate a framework where multiple functional and assurance controls are introduced at
each layer of ICS architectural design to further enhance security while maintaining critical real-time
transfer of command and control traffic.
Keywords: Industrial Control Systems; SCADA; Critical National Infrastructure
1. Introduction
A significant number of industries focus their activities and business in process automation and
system control. Most of these activities are controlled by Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) with a
key role and applications in nuclear facilities, manufacturing, and the Critical National infrastructure
(CNI) [1]. As technology progressed, these systems did not seem to have developed system security or
remedial action plans as required by legal and regulatory compliance. These systems have also become
more reliant on conventional IT technology to facilitate communications leading to vulnerabilities and
several attack vectors from the integration of IT operations with physical components [2]. The secure
inclusion of these systems is still an open issue, with large-scale parallel computations over the Cloud
being another factor influencing the security of these systems. There is now a growing concern
about the safety and security of CNI components controlled by ICS due to the increased frequency
of reactive malware attacks in such infrastructures transforming them into an emerging platform
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for multistage cyberattacks, terrorism, and crime with direct impact on the physical domain [3].
Typical components that can be found in an ICS environment vary greatly from basic sensors and
actuators to highly complex devices called Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). These devices
use a variety of operational technology, including pneumatic, hydraulic, mechanical, and electrical.
There are numerous manufacturers of these components all over the world, and there are varying
standards that have been deployed. The underlying complexity and heterogeneity of the infrastructure
almost exponentially increase its attack surface. Defence in depth is a strategy that often seeks to
delay adversarial actions against an infrastructure by increasing the complexity and resilience of
that infrastructure and allow time for detection response [4]. Many organizations employ defence in
depth measures, particularly within information-technology infrastructures. However, they do not
apply it to ICS operations. The legacy equipment used in these infrastructures has been traditionally
considered as hack-proof due to its separation from the IT infrastructure/physical protection measures
in place. Unfortunately, co-ordinated cyberattacks have proved how vulnerable critical infrastructure
ICS is to protect its assets. Defence in depth often deploys specific controls to counter and neutralise
security risks while employed as a holistic approach for cyber-resilience on all assets [5]. It takes
under consideration the interconnection and dependencies between assets and available resources
to provide adequate protection against security risks. The relationship between vulnerabilities and
controls against operations, personnel, and technology that makes up ICS environments is a crucial
factor to be considered in order to apply in-depth defensive measures.
This shifting paradigm shows the significant effect of the cyberspace as a key component in
the safety and security of these close linked embedded systems. The inherently “closed” nature of
these systems offered a certain degree of immunity against attacks over many years in the past.
The security implications related to their core operation and communication with other legacy
systems were not explored in-depth, and systemwide security was not regarded as a priority. Most
of these systems have recently developed links and connections to the public infrastructure, with
their threat landscape continually evolving [6]. Specific changes related to energy-sector deregulation
and privatisation seems to have further contributed to concerns around secure ICS composition
properties [7]. ICS environments are fundamentally different from conventional IT systems, further
complicating the process of securing them. These differences between ICS and IT environments include
the product-lifecycle period. For ICS devices, that is up to 15 years, whereas IT systems tend to be
replaced every three to five years. Availability and contingency requirements are also higher for ICS
due to the real-time nature of their operation. That makes it difficult for patching, updating, and
replacement cycles to take place as frequently as in IT systems. Finally, protocol stacks in ICS, such
as Modbus and DNP3, are usually bespoke and tailored in a given context of operation without the
unnecessary overhead associated with IT protocol stacks [8].
The composition of the overall control system consists of different ICSs components, each of which
is designed and deployed for the exact environment within which it operates. The expected outputs
from the processes also play a crucial role in the design of these components. The geographical
dispersion of these systems also adds to the complexity of the two main subsystems, namely,
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Distributed Control Systems
(DCS), dictating deployment requirements [9,10]. Typical SCADA deployments span over large
geographical locations, whereas DCS are usually factory-based. The sensitivity and criticality of these
systems are often linked to the facility they control. Nuclear facilities, for example, are regarded
as highly sensitive and potentially dangerous facilities with different risk appetites and thresholds.
The systematic migration from analogue to digital controls and the integration of so-called “smart”
technologies (e.g., smart grids [11], Intelligent Transport Systems [12], smart cities [13]), seems to
increase further risk sensitivity in ICS environments [14]. An additional factor that contributes to
increased security implications is the convergence of ICS Operational technology and Enterprise IT
architectures. That signifies an over-reliance on IT for core security operations at both tactical and
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operational levels. The discussed factors and ever-increasing costs to implementing defences in legacy
ICS systems have rendered the protection of these systems highly problematic [15].
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the ICS components and
key differences between ICS and IT environments. Section 3 presents the key threats, attack vectors,
and defences for ICSs, with emphasis on their impact and defence complexities. In Section 4 we
analyse the exploits and defence strategies currently identified in ICS and the gaps with regards to the
static controls against adaptive attack vectors against these environments. In Section 5, we present
our framework in which functional and assurance controls are introduced in the different architecture
layers of an ICS using orthogonality. Finally, Section 6 concludes our work.
2. ICS Components
A typical ICS environment includes a vast range of components from sensors and actuators
to PLCs with different operational technologies applied in this ecosystem. The supply chain is
also geographically dispersed with a variety of standards applied from production to distribution.
The key categories of ICS components are: (1) Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), (2) Remote
Terminal Units (RTUs), (3) PLCs, (4) Master Terminal Units (MTUs), (5) Human–Machine Interfaces
(HMI), (6) Data Historians, and (7) Input/Output (I/O) Servers [16]. One of the most basic forms of
preprogrammed and often embedded software is firmware (ROM or EPROM). This software operates at
the component level and enables cross-component communication as their primary function. Although
the supplier usually releases firmware updates, the means to deliver and deploy these updates to
the device are often susceptible to attacks. In several cases, the firmware-patching process is delayed
or postponed to enable continuous processes to complete their cycles. These patches are usually
bug- and security-related fixes, with significant implications to the secure and safe operation of these
devices [15].
2.1. Software
Bespoke software usually runs on various components in ICSs, tailored to their operations,
environment, and models. The dynamic nature of PLCs and their reliability and flexibility have
increased their adaptation across several industries in the last forty years. As the integration of
automated technology becomes the norm for industrial manufacturers, PLCs have several benefits
over traditional hardware products [17]. These systems promise to facilitate more straightforward
integration with existing networking platforms and further simplify their deployment. Software-based
PLCs can reduce production costs and enhance security and safety with strict authorisation principles
embedded in their core operation. Several guidelines under The International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) were published to standardise programming languages in PLCs in IEC 61131 [18].
This set of guidelines has been widely revised and adopted with explicit references to object-oriented
programming, standard data types, and acceptable programming processes, such as Ladder Diagrams
(LD), Function Block Diagrams (FBD), and Sequential Function Charts (SFC). In LD, graphic symbols
are used in a “ladder-type" formation that constitutes a core PLC programming language. Signal-flow
lines are used in FBD, very similar to electric circuits, and vastly applied to DCSs. Sequential behaviour
is defined as using SFC as a high-level language that originated from Petri-Net analysis. SFC is
considered flexible regarding its integration with other languages. Textual languages are a separate
category that includes Instruction List (IL) and Structured Text (ST). The architecture of the PLC
software model is defined in Part 3 of the IEC 1131. There is often a distinction made between the notion
of a configuration (high-level) and resources needed in the processing environment (low-level) [19,20].
2.2. ICS vs. IT Environments
The main difference between the two systems is that the IT environment essentially manages data,
while the ICS manages the physical environment [21]. Over time, the advancement of communication
technologies combined with a reduction in costs have attracted ICS to embrace the IT communication
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technologies. This has introduced new risks within the ICS environment, and has potentially severe
ramifications with regard to safety. The significant differences between the two environments are
focused on performance-, availability-, risk-, and operation-related metrics [16]. The criticality of
real-time communication is paramount in an ICS, whereas high throughput is usually a fundamental
requirement of an IT system. Emergency responses are also more critical in an ICS environment
due to potential safety and environmental impacts. Planned outages within an IT environment are
generally acceptable within agreed parameters. However, ICSs require high availability and often
need to continuously run. This makes it imperative that exhaustive testing is carried out, and to
sometimes have fully redundant systems available. In the IT environment, the most significant risk
is to data confidentiality, integrity, and availability, whereas ICS risks mostly revolve around system
safety and availability, with an integrated risk-management approach fundamentally important
to its operations [22]. This makes fault tolerance essential for ICSs, with punitive measures for
noncompliance to government regulations that impact safety or the environment. System operation
in an ICS environment is made more complicated due to the high number of proprietary operating
systems. Upgrades are more complicated and need to be carefully implemented. Finally, system
memory in ICS components is usually very restrictive compared with IT components.
3. Threats and Defence Technologies in Industrial Control Systems
Current practice to implement cyber defence is mainly scoped on vulnerability assessment rather
than threat modelling, which includes risk identification and evaluation. This assumes a potential
attack vector, an actor with malicious intent, and an opportunity to exploit an existing vulnerability [23].
There are three main approaches to perform risk assessment: qualitative, quantitative, or a hybrid
scheme incorporating the first two types. While quantitative risk assessment estimates risk based on a
numerical estimation of probabilities, a qualitative approach could mark risk as low, medium, or high.
Therefore, qualitative risk analysis is more suitable for recognising the wider implication of hazards,
and can be demonstrated and modelled using Petri Nets that can be utilised to analyse risk. Petri Nets
are developed based on the calculated risk metrics together with the process function of the ICS or
SCADA systems. This analysis method emphasises finding the preconditions under which various
modes of failure would occur. Additionally, it helps to determine the associated consequences for such
failure. Hence, outcomes are crucial for decision makers in an ICS environment when developing and
implementing policies related to risk assessment and governance [24]. For a substantial evaluation of
potential risk associated with the exploitation of vulnerabilities of an ICS, each system layer should be
considered. However, the performance of the systematic procedures for conducting this assessment
in a production environment can be limited by the criticality of the system to the strategic business
continuity plan. As a workaround, testing is almost exclusively performed in testbeds or discrete
laboratory environments.
ICS environments are complex by design, which presents technical challenges when replicating
system’s behaviour in an emulator. For example, scalability is a feature required to import the complete
set characteristics of the tested physical system. In many cases, both new and legacy protocols and
components exist and should be planned for. This introduces complexity constraints and costs that
could limit the testing methodology to testbeds based on software-only simulations. Software-based
simulations run with a margin of error as they cannot account for all various states of a cyber–physical
system. It is also acknowledged that the accuracy of software-based testbeds requires validation
and extensive verification of the accuracy of the results. A cost-effective approach that has gained
popularity is the use of Hardware-In-The Loop Testbeds (HITL) as it reduces costs while maintaining
efficiency [25].
3.1. Hardware-in-the-Loop Testbeds
This type of testbeds can be utilised to examine physical hardware components (e.g., PLC).
The I/O interface between the testbed and a component is a Serial Interface Board (SIB) that creates a
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loop with the host computer. The SIB is responsible for converting digital to analogue signals (and vice
versa) to facilitate communication between the two parties (the host and the component). Additionally,
the host includes an emulator to simulate the process and system dynamics. This hybrid approach,
combining both physical and virtual elements, provides better accuracy to how the several layers are
represented. Figure 1 shows a schematic example of a typical HITL. The number of real-time simulators
supporting HITL has increasingly been utilised to support the development of laboratory experiments.
Furthermore, they can be used to perform penetration testing and therefore evaluates the efficiency
of proposed countermeasures. It is inevitable to expect good testbeds to support a wide range of
hardware components in addition to a variety of software packages. Hardware-in-the-loop testbeds
have recently been utilised by the USF Smart Grid Power System Laboratory to evaluate several
mitigation strategies against cyberattacks to the power grid and other particular energy-management
schemes [26].
Figure 1. Typical Hardware-In-The Loop (HITL) testbed configuration [25].
3.2. Virtual SCADA (VSCADA) Testbeds
Facilitating testing in a virtual environment, this type of testbeds is a software-based solution.
For a VSCADA testbed to be effective, the following design objectives should be met [27]:
1. Scalability: You should be able to have a scalable environment while simultaneously supporting
interaction with multiple users.
2. Standardisation: The environment’s virtual model must integrate various communication
protocols, such as Modbus and DNP3.
3. Reconfigurability: The environment’s ability to simulate several network topologies and physical
devices must be maintained.
4. Effective virtualisation: The environment must provide an accurate representation of the physical
system. This typically covers all main behavioural characteristics.
Authors in Reference [27] analysed VSCADA by separating between the back-end and the
front-end of the infrastructure. The back-end is mainly responsible for generating data and processing
system events to simulate the topology, while front-end infrastructure covers tasks such as the
replication of control functions. A good example for such a testbed is the physical 1:87 scale
minicity created by the SANS Institute. It has several represented ICS including mass-transit and
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electrical-distribution systems. The application of this model ranges from regular training and testing
to supporting military exercises [28]. Furthermore, some methods help to profile cyberattackers based
on their knowledge, motivation, and technical resources [29]. Researchers could rely on the success
rates of these profiles to accordingly model their testbeds. The National SCADA Testbed (NSTB) was
developed to enhance the built-in security of the energy-supply systems by the U.S. Office of Electricity
Delivery and Energy Reliability. The facility provides a suitable environment to perform research on
threat detection and system-vulnerability assessment in SCADA systems within the energy sector.
3.3. ICS Architecture Layers
The architecture of the ICS is dissected into several layers to develop a specialised understanding
of the overall system. This approach allows for detailed vulnerability assessment to be performed,
which is inevitable to gain a better understanding of the problem and develop better cyberdefence
techniques. The different layers of an ICS are demonstrated in Figure 2. A layered ICS model
was developed in Reference [25] to look beyond vulnerability assessment to a holistic and more
detailed approach. This helps to apply a defence-in-depth strategy that is especially useful since these
layers contain interconnected functionality. Therefore, the consequences of exploiting an element
within a layer affect others. For example, actual electronic components, such as microprocessors
and microcontrollers, are represented within the hardware layer of a given ICS. This layer facilitates
access (command and control) to all layers above. An accurate input/output process is therefore
fundamental for the system to work. Threat modelling for actual devices recovers two main attack
vectors: firstly, when the device is compromised by attackers while working in an ICS; secondly, when
an actor in the supply chain (e.g., the manufacturer) deliberately compromises the device. Attacking
an operational environment to target a device requires a lot of resources to perform the required level
of reconnaissance and footprinting, in addition to building intelligence around the device and the
system in which it operates [25].
Figure 2. Model of the Architecture Layers of an Industrial Control System (ICS) [25].
Attacks against the system’s integrity can occur at any stage, as early as the product-design,
chip-manufacturing, or supply-chain stage. Spoofing attacks can involve the modification of the actual
chip by altering Boolean gates, bridging wires, or inserting additional buffers. When a backdoor is
deployed to allow remote access and elevate privilege, the term used to describe this attack vector is
Hardware Trojan. This allows access to further confidential data, such as encryption keys. Remote
access with elevated privilege gives the ability to maintain access by installing more malicious software.
Denial of service is another threat, for instance, a time bomb could be utilised to degrade performance
or disable the device. Attackers tend to adopt transparent techniques to cause minimal modifications
and avoid Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [25].
Side-channel attacks imposes another form of threat where small integrated circuits are attacked
through wireless or power channels [30]. These attacks exploit electromagnetic emanations or even
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acoustic vibrations to eavesdrop to information leaked from the device. Cryptographic algorithms
can also be vulnerable to side-channel attacks by means of differential or simple power analysis.
Some attackers manipulate selected values computed by the hardware component during normal
operation by deliberately injecting errors. This is known as a Fault Injection attack and it aims to
affect the performance of the device. Examples include tampering with environmental operating
temperature, power supply, or even the device’s clock [25].
The firmware layer is located between the hardware and software layers and acts as a bridge
between the two. This layer supports the execution and functionality of compiled programmes.
The low and powerful level of control at this layer makes it very attractive for attacks aimed at
an ICS. An example of a prominent attack at this layer can be initiated by reverse-engineering the
firmware; this attempt, if successful, recovers the underpinning code and provides insight into the
core functionality of the device, including potential weaknesses and the opportunity to exploit it [31].
Further, the attackers would usually search for protocols and authentication techniques that have not
been properly designed or implemented. Another attack is buffer overflow if a relevant vulnerability is
identified as a result of bad programming practices. Reverse-engineering firmware exposes the system
to injection attacks of malicious code at a low level. Below, we describe three known steps to perform
reverse-engineering [25]:
1. Firmware image acquisition: the attacker acquires a copy of the firmware code. Acquisition can
either be a copy obtained directly from the manufacturer or by utilising the Joint Test Action
Group (JTAG) testing port to extract the code.
2. Binary analysis: Techniques such as “binwalk” and binary differentials can be used by the attacker
to learn information about the used encoding, file systems, and checksum values.
3. Binary disassembly: Further analysis, such as extracting and studying ASCII strings from the
firmware, is performed to understand firmware functionality.
PLCs within an ICS environment are known to be a popular target. Therefore, it is recommended
to have a policy to keep the running firmware on these devices patched and updated. Further to the
benefit of closing all known security flaws, such a policy could reduce the number of existing bugs
affecting the usability side of the software [25]. That being said, there are challenges to be accounted
for before planning or enforcing such policies. For example, some environments, due to reasons related
to business continuity, are required to be running 99.999% of the time, which equates to a maximum
downtime of under 6 min of per annum. This is problematic because firmware patches produced by
vendors are regularly released and often require a device reboot. In practice, this is one of the factors
to explain why patches are applied late, if applied at all, in a year’s time. Before the Internet era, there
was an argument around the efficiency of implementing a security-by-obscurity strategy, where many
organisations took their chances running unpatched software since vulnerabilities were not published
[32]. However, the way we are interconnected today and the new era of common vulnerabilities and
exposure databases being regularly updated means that the probability of discovered vulnerabilities
being exploited is a question of time.
The software layer contains the functionality responsible for translating human input and passing
it through to the machine, and vice versa. Therefore, attackers on this level focus on HMI, and any
available terminals controlling the ICS processes. The software can either be off-the-shelf (offered
commercially to many clients) or bespoke and specifically designed for the ICS. This affects the type
of attack vectors to assess; bespoke software is not widely tested while off-the-shelf and could open
a wide range of attack surfaces, from kernel exploits, command injections, to known vulnerabilities
reported by the professional community. HMIs and workstations on an ICS platform could also be
exploited online via attacks on web browsers through Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), drive-by-download,
malware, and other techniques. Additionally, the infamous zero-day exploits pose a prominent
threat and can remain undetected to software developers for long periods of time [33]. PLCs are also
targeted because they are widely used in ICS and SCADA systems. The presence of numerous security
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implications at this layer was attributed to the complexity of the software running on PLCs, and the
lack of highly skilled programmers working in this area and having sufficient training in cybersecurity.
Attackers armed with the internal knowledge of the system can modify PLC operation. The Stuxnet
worm is a recent and widely cited example of a cyberwarfare weapon exploiting a vulnerability at the
software layer [34]. Compromising the software layer gives access to the legitimate control flow of
the ICS to alter underpinning technologies. Similarities between software at this layer compared to
toolkits in a typical ICT environment provides opportunities to utilise existing tools, either directly
or after certain amendments to perform reconnaissance, footprinting, and eventually gain access to
the ICS. Freely available and extremely powerful penetration-testing toolkits include Kali Linux and
ParrotSec [35].
ICSs can be distributed across large distances, and such a design includes a central master system
managing remote locations over several communication channels. The availability element is therefore
critical, and mitigation against denial-of-service attacks becomes a priority. Attack vectors in this
case depend on factors including the type of used pipeline-monitoring systems, signal (analogue and
digital), and communication protocols. The protocols that the MTUs and RTUs share must be the
same for the system to function, and it is possible to find existing implementations utilising governing
standards developed prior to introducing the relevant International Standards Organisation (ISO)
standards [36]. Two widely used protocols in SCADA systems are Modbus and DNP3, and they both
have numerous known vulnerabilities. Therefore, many bespoke protocols operating at the lower
two layers of the above model are not published to add a layer of security, strategically known as
security by obscurity. However, since security was not considered when these protocols were first
developed, they remain insecure by design. Since the risk of a cyberattack continues to increase,
next-generation protocols are developed based on common information models, such as IEC 61850,
which improves security.
The process layer comes next in the ICS architecture. It controls the processing logic within the
ICS and governs the limits that have been programmed into the system. Cyberattacks could modify
variables related to the control logic that changes process states. This could halt the system (denial of
service). To avoid detection, attackers ensure that no component is operating beyond its acceptable
limits [25]. The Stuxnet worm, which targeted a uranium-enriching plant in Iran, attacked the process
layer. Stuxnet modified specific Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) files, and the attack vector is believed to
have been a mobile storage device. The payload was able to manipulate the PLCs that controlled spin
speed to eventually destroy several of the centrifuges. The vulnerability was within Siemens Step7
software that was running on Windows computers to program the PLCs. A rootkit was utilised to
keep the infection hidden from system administrators for as long as possible [37].
4. ICS Exploits and Defence Strategies
Extensive work has been done in Reference [25] to identify threats in each layer of the ICS model,
with a detailed summary in Tables 1 and 2. Following this work, a taxonomy of these threats and
exploits, where applicable, was discussed in Reference [38]. Their work provides a more granular
and holistic approach to these threats and vulnerabilities, and underpins the key elements to an
informed defence-in-depth strategy in the ICS concept of operations. In addition, empirical evidence
suggests that multistage cyberattacks tend to be more successful [28]. This would necessitate further
a comprehensive defence strategy across all layers of the ICS. The first fully operational emulated
cyberattacks were conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under the codename
“Aurora”. The fully functional generator was connected to the power grid, successfully attacked, and
physically destroyed using classified exploits [39]. The weaponisation of this space has led to the
creation of an ecosystem, whereby organised crime rings can develop, reverse-engineer, and sell ICS
crimeware and exploits to the highest bidder [40]. These attacks are devastating, as violations to the
electronic space have an adverse effect to the physical space.
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Table 1. Taxonomy of known threats.
Taxonomy of Known Threats
Layer Threat Category Threats Typical Examples of Known Exploits
Software
Memory attacks, control-
flow attacks.
Modified software behaviour, buffer/stack overflows. Data historian data compromised; buffer overflow attacks; software operation
modified to perform unwanted actions.
Web attacks. Open ports on firewall cross-side scripting, SQL injection, database
attacks.
Reconnaissance of network to compromise devices; rootkits installed; privileges
elevated; data confidentiality, integrity, and availability compromised; data
stolen; denial-of-service (DOS) attacks; Smurf attacks; spyware; malware viruses,
installed trojans.
Access Control No privilege segregation, credentials stolen. Unauthorised access, privilege escalation.
Zero-day vulnerabilities. Inherent flaw in software exploited unbeknown to the vendor, exploited
by attackers’ Kernel, design flaws; misconfigurations.
Zero-day attacks; viruses, worms, Trojans installed; buffer overflows; replay
attacks; rootkits installed; privileges elevated; data compromised; spyware.
Network
Firewall
misconfiguration.
Firewall rules incorrectly configured, open ports. Backdoors inserted; logic or time bombs installed; data/information stolen;
sniffers installed.
Access control. Unauthorised physical access, unauthorised logical access, Wi-Fi access
points and communications.
Network traffic sniffed to steal credentials; man-in-the-middle attacks; malware
installed from portable media; insider attacks; untrained employees subjected to
phishing attacks.
Protocol vulnerabilities. Control signals modified, cryptographic attacks, communication
hijacking and spoofing, communication stack attacks, Modbus and DNP3
vulnerabilities, covert channels exploited, replay attacks.
Syn/Ack attacks and flooding; fragmentation attacks; replay attacks;
man-in-the-middle attacks; DOS attacks; bypassing controls; eavesdropping;
traffic analysis; tunnelling; false command and control communications; exploits
of TCP/lP stack; UDP port attacks; Smurf attacks; idle scans (e.g., Nmap); ARP
spoofing; chain/loop attacks.
Process
Internet-facing threats. Similar to web attacks above cryptographic attacks. Man-in-the-middle attacks; Cinderella attacks; DDOS attacks; rootkits installed;
masquerading; spying and sniffers.
Process-aware malware. Malware specifically designed to compromise/alter a specific process,
sabotage/terrorism.
Stuxnet worm altered Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) operation.
False-data injection. Control logic-modified process variables and constants modified Aurora vulnerability; modified state estimation in power grids.
Automatic payload
generation.
Malicious payload delivered to PLCs, Remote Terminal Units (RTUs),
and Master Terminal Units (MTUs).
PLCs exploited, process hijacked.
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Table 2. Taxonomy of known threats (Cont.).
Taxonomy of Known Threats (Cont.)
Layer Threat Category Threats Typical Examples of Known Exploits
Hardware
Hardware trojans. Modification by: design architects, manufacturers, supply chain prior to
operation, attacks during normal operation, stack-smashing, exceeding
fixed memory allocation.
Backdoors for remote attacks; time-bombs; elevation of privileges;
access to cryptographic keys; access to higher layers; degradation of
performance; destruction of component or device.
Fault-injection attacks. Faults injected. Computational results modified, low-accuracy fault
injection—modification of operating environment without operator
aware. lon beams causing bits to flip.
Device performance degraded; modification of operating temperatures;
device clock modified; dataset points modified; false data passed to the
controllers and data historian.
Side-channel attacks. Wireless snooping, electromagnetic emanations, acoustic vibrations,
simple power analysis.
Information leakages to extract information such as cryptographic keys.
Firmware
Firmware
reverse-engineering.
Firmware image acquisition, binary analysis, binary disassembly
cryptographic attacks.
Directly from manufacturer; from the JTAG testing port to obtain
firmware, using “binwalk” and binary differentials to reverse-engineer
firmware/ASCII strings analysed and disassembled/communications
decrypted.
Firmware vulnerabilities. Firmware updates and patches not applied, legacy systems with
unsupported firmware.
Security vulnerabilities exploited and components compromised, higher
layers compromised.
Firmware modifications Firmware modified to perform illegal processes. Component malfunction/destruction.
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Certain classes of controls have been introduced within the ICS environment to mitigate risks
and ensure information security and safety. Senior management are responsible for setting up
and monitoring the classes of controls as appropriate. These have been categorised as: Security
Assessment and Authorisation, Planning and Auditing, Overall Risk Assessment (evaluation and
analysis), System and Services Acquisition, and Programme Management. A detailed description
and the subcomponents of each category can be found in Reference [41]. Physical security is also an
important factor to ICS facilities for all local and remote stations with the aim to further reduce the
risks against all assets in the environment. Assets include both tangible and intangible, including data
specific to the ICS. Robust access controls and monitoring systems should be in place with different
assigned authorisation levels and clearance as dictated in Reference [41]. De facto role-based access
control (RBAC) is often used as a means to logically control-operator access in both the physical and
electronic domain within the ICS operations. RBAC application has been proven a complex process
that can often lead to disconnection between high-level policies and the implementation of physical
controls. In addition, there are instances where additional discretionary access may need to be granted
to certain individuals. It is therefore recommended that careful consideration be made on the two
aspects of high-level access and low-level physical-system access [42].
4.1. Traffic Encryption
Encryption algorithms and protocols are essential to ICS to assure both confidentiality and
integrity. These algorithms should also be compatible with existing and emerging authentication
protocols, suitable in this environment for all different types of deployed sensors and actuators.
Conventional cryptographic algorithms pose significant performance degradation in systems where
real-time processes must be executed in a secure and safe manner. Recent protocols, such as IEC
62351-1 and AGA-12, have introduced delays due to asymmetric applied cryptography limiting their
usage in specific scenarios within the ICS environment. Lightweight asymmetric encryption is an open
issue in these environments, with several approaches introduced in the public domain [43]. The scope
of the IEC 62351-1 is to provide a guided service for information security for power-system control
operations. The main focus of the standard is not only to specify standardisation for communication
protocols, but also to explicate various aspects of information security as applied to power-system
operations. Technical specifications for the used communication protocols are explicitly defined in
IEC 62351 to 62351-6, whereas end-to-end information security with a focus on enhancing overall
management of the communication networks supporting power systems is described in IEC 62351-7.
The standard contains provisions to ensure integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality for different
protocols used in power systems [44].
4.2. Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Real-time transmissions in ICS can often be a penalty factor to the accuracy and speed of Intrusion
Detection and Prevention systems (IDPS). Certain branches of mathematics in machine-learning
approaches can support the process of building new models of behaviour within ICS, and better
inform detection processes as a whole. The topology and synergies within the ICS network dictates
the adaptation of these systems to better detect and stop attacks against ICS components [45].
IDPS components from sensors to management consoles can be connected via the actual ICS network
or through a management network completely isolated from the production systems. The positioning
of these sensors, the amount of data logged or collected, and modifications to the existing environment
have to be considered prior to deployment. The whole process must be governed by a comprehensive
risk assessment only for IDPS deployment within the ICS network [46].
4.3. Disaster Recovery and Business-Continuity Planning
Increased complexity and interdependencies in an ICS network mean that a problem in an area
might have rapid and often unexpected impact on a different area within the same environment.
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ICS environments are part of a broader CNI where all parts of the supply chain are interconnected,
and many requirements must also be integrated. That environment creates additional technical risks
with regard to business-continuity management, where impact is more likely to be greater and more
frequent. ICS in particular is a clear manifestation in which recovery-point objectives (PRO) must
be zero or near data loss to maintain both their efficacy and purpose. It is therefore fundamentally
important to create more efficient continuity strategies and investment to identify areas in which
entities are critical to mission achievement in ICS environments. The key standards introduced are the
NFPA 1600 family, ISO 22301, ASIS SPC.1-2009, and BS 25999 Parts 1 and 2.
5. Orthogonal Defence-in-Depth Framework
Layered protection in ICSs does not only relate to adequate controls in IT infrastructure, as
this is not enough to deter or prevent adversaries. Network-related impairment and strict quality
requirements are additional factors to be considered when applying security controls in an ICS [47].
An informed defence-in-depth strategy must consider the output of detailed risk and vulnerability
assessments, incident management, and support by senior management for all licensed operators in
ICS facilities [48]. It is common to conduct iterative risk and vulnerability assessments as the first
step of implementing a defence-in-depth framework. Figure 3 illustrates the possible attack surface
when IT and ICS environments are integrated whereas Figure 4 illustrates the NIST approach to
framing risk. Risk assessments and risk-treatment plans have been embedded in the IT environment
for many years, but only recently been introduced into the cyber–physical ICS environment. Authors
in Reference [49] detailed the impact and frequency product in the core of this operation, and the
factor that underpins controls to be introduced in qualitative, quantitative, and hybrid approaches [50].
Various quantitative and qualitative hybrid models examples exist with typical four-by-four matrices,
as shown in in Figure 5, which describe risk categories. The key elements to be considered is the
method selected to carry out risk assessments, deployed risk models, and adaptation of risk appetite to
properly enumerate the threat landscape in particular cases in which IT and ICS integration takes place.
Risk-mitigation plans have recently found their way in the cyber–physical ICS environment [51–53].
The key components of an informed defence-in-depth framework, within which assurance and
functional controls could be integrated, are presented as follows.
Figure 3. Example of integrated IT and ICS environment (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009).
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Figure 4. Generic risk model (NIST SP 800-82r2, 2015).
Figure 5. Matrices to assign a quantitative value to likelihood and impact.
5.1. Integrated Trusted Protection
The concept of “trusted” protection evolved from several cyber–cybersecurity guidelines
published over time by ENISA and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This concept
has emerged as a security-hardening approach where reliability and availability are at its core, with
recent applications in the energy sector [54]. Trust management is the basis of this concept subdivided
into elements, such as the Trusted Computing Platform, Trusted Protection Mechanism, and Trusted
Network Management. Within this trust-management environment, TCP control operates at the
hardware and firmware levels of the ICS. That seeks to ensure strict authentication and verification
techniques throughout the whole lifecycle of an ICS operation. Each process must be carefully
monitored, and its credibility must be established via restrictive executions and protection against
illegal read commands, impersonation, and fabrication attacks, while adequate intrusion detection and
prevention is in place [55]. Specific isolation techniques have been introduced in the literature, very
similar to VPN-encrypted tunnels that operate dynamically at the layer of the field devices. Authors in
Reference [56] introduced the secure-protection domain (SPD) (Figure 6). Authentication and control
policies should also be strictly applied so data flows are limited to trusted domains within the storage
area. No untrusted processes should be executed involving sensitive or critical data. Finally, TCN
control operates between the cyber–physical layer and the enterprise network, and prevents malicious
activities from both internal and external attacks. Enterprise baseline security is used in these scenarios,
from monitoring at the application layer up to trusted computing modules [57]. The credibility of
nodes is judged on past and current performance upon which models of behaviour are developed
to justify thresholds of acceptance. TNM control is aimed at detecting these types of attack where
variation in attack strategy and path is manifested. These concepts together tie with the five layers of
an ICS or SCADA system, and the development of an enhanced defence-in-depth strategy.
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Figure 6. Trusted data-protection mechanism [56].
5.2. ICS and Incident Management
The ability to rapidly respond to security incidents is another key component of the
defence-in-depth strategy. Critical parameters such as real-time availability, safety, and integrity
must be hardcoded in the interaction of ICS components and services. A model was introduced
in the literature from the decision-making theory to partially address these issues [58]. The model
introduces the descriptive, predictive, and prescriptive parts to record incident details and project
both development and lateral movement and communication mechanisms. Steps in the process
include capturing traffic patterns and behaviours from all ICS components, including sensors and
devices. The next step is to use standard Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF), as
defined in the RFC 4765, to formalise threat description and information exchange about severity and
compromised subsystems in an ICS environment. Finally, data aggregation is used to build a profile of
the attack and lateral movement within the ICS subsystems or systems that have been compromised.
The predictive part is considered the correlation phase of the response-decision framework where
the impact of the attacks is quantified. The system uses pattern-detection models and algorithms to
extract information from raw data and build attack metadata during the correlation phase. Authors in
Reference [59] introduced a statistical algorithm based on the Semi-Markov Chain that attempts to
quantify the impact of an attack from the number of alerts generated from each component within
the infrastructure. Information is then evaluated for those nodes that had already been compromised.
As observations change, the state changes and may have a different duration (also called sojourn
time) to the previous state. These changes of states allow for the prediction of a future state based on
recorded changes in the state over time. The prescriptive portion of the model selects the best course of
action with regard to remediating the impact of an attack. This process is not straightforward, as expert
knowledge on ramifications for each action is required to achieve the objectives of the defined security
policies. A three-step scenario for the prescriptive incident response was introduced in Reference [58]
(See Figure 7). The purpose of the decision framework is to transform ICS from a “nonconfirmity”
status during or after an attack to a “conformity status” by applying all corrective actions in a timely
manner that effectively decreases Mean Time to Recovery (MTTR) and Mean Time Between Failures
(MTBF) to the lowest possible values.
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Figure 7. Incident-response decision framework [58].
5.3. Orthogonality of Security Controls
Orthogonal security controls have been introduced in the nuclear sector, whereby layered security
is imposed in a two-dimensional approach at each layer in ICS environments.The idea is that, at every
layer, at least two controls are deployed that are complementary to each other. The orthogonality
principle has its roots in linear algebra, spherical trigonometry, Euclidean geometry, and other
advanced mathematical approaches, and implies a perpendicular approach. The application of
orthogonality in the nuclear facilities has been a clear case in which the controls could be tested in the
most secure yet most sought-after target for cyberwarfare due to its significance. Authors in Reference
[60] also addressed regulation issues imposed by the U.S. Government in Title 10 of the Codification of
Federal Regulation (CFR). Subsection 73.54 requires compliance by the licensed operator of nuclear
facilities to protect against security breaches and service and data violations. Approval is needed for all
cybersecurity-related plans by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), with high assurance always
demonstrated to satisfy the terms of operators’ licence. Various templates have been developed to
help with compliance using guidance documents such as NRC RG 5.71:2010 and NEI 08-09 Rev.6:2010.
In addition, the process of defence in diversity follows the principles of multivendor-protection
approach, whereby multiple suppliers are used to enhancing the overall security status of registered
assets. The aim is to mitigate weaknesses present in specific products by strengths presented in
different ones (NIST SP 800-53r4, 2013). Layered malware defence is an excellent example of such an
approach where predictive analytics on top of its deployment can further improve malware defence.
The relationship between vulnerabilities and controls against operations, personnel, and
technology that makes up ICS environments is a crucial factor to be considered in order to apply
defence in depth measures. The application of layered security with functional assurance metrics in
ICS architectures, as presented in our framework, identifies a target intent capability and opportunities
against ICS operations, personnel, and technology. This allows for better-informed defence in
alignment with standards and controls, and optimisation of policies and procedures, while increasing
situational awareness and supply-chain security. The current framework can help policymakers and
security personnel to identify evolving categories of threats in an ICS environment and reduce its
long-term exposure. Overall security functions are clearly defined and distinguished from information
technology based on the requirement that they can impact operation, resilience, and legal and
regulatory compliance. This is because of elements such as patch management, change management,
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and as a drastically different classification between IT and ICS environments. These differences dictate
a drastically different approach to the used testing and auditing methods, the difficulty in forensic
auditing processes in ICS environments, and interdependencies of business processes affected by
security events. Our framework seeks to further explore the combination of people, technology,
operations, and situational awareness from an adversarial point of view of emerging threats to an ICS.
The existing framework improves overall resilience by clearly identifying and increasing the cost of
intrusion while improving the probability of detection and capability to react while maintaining an
explicit mapping against the assurance controls necessary. The framework can be used as a baseline
to understand relative security risks to the support infrastructure both in IT and ICS, identify and
prioritise process systems that can be affected by security threats, and analyse interconnections and
dependencies to better articulate the impact of a security breach to the critical functions and related
business processes. By aligning functional and assurance controls in traditional defence-in-depth
strategies for ICS in this framework, a better understanding can be established on how compensating
controls can be applied for protection in such a complex environment without raising risk to the
overall system. Existing challenges with the proposed framework include its integration to existing
risk-management practices related to corporate-strategy policies, tactical policies and procedures
including guidance and constraints, and feedback with regard to monitoring results.
5.4. Shortfalls of Existing Defence-in-Depth Strategies
The systematic review of the previously presented strategies demonstrates their limitations to
adequately protect against skilful and motivated adversaries. Most security operations are carried
out by conventional IT systems operating within the ICS environment. The combination of existing
strategies in a holistic and robust defence-in-depth strategy is therefore necessary given the increase
in both frequency and sophistication of attacks in recent years. Examples of advanced persistent
threats, such as Stuxnet and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, have manifested their ability to cause significant
disruption and impact on infrastructure-supporting facilities. The legal and regulatory compliance
for interconnected ICSs with online access is also of paramount importance that seems to be lacking
the conformity status required by these systems [15]. Search engines for vulnerable systems, such as
SHODAN, have also been used to map ICS equipment in railway signalling and traffic-control systems,
posing additional threats to their overall safety and security. It is clear that, since electronic attacks on
ICS have a significant impact in the physical domain, the transition on how to better understand how
technology, people, and infrastructure are implemented to better protect against adaptive attack vectors
becomes a necessity. Geographic distance between different ICS systems also seems to no longer be
relevant for cyberdefence [61]. Attackers are now equally active from long distances, with an increased
impact on their attacks and, to a certain degree, immune to prosecution from law enforcement due
to legal restrictions across countries. The traditional defence-in-depth approach incorporates several
elements of layered defence principles and often assumes counterattacks at its core. Counterattacking
seems to be unrealistic in the public domain and ICS environments in particular given both the
questionable benefit from such an action and strained resources allocated in cyberdefence.
5.5. Enhanced Defence-in-Depth Strategies
The U.S. NRC proposed a five-security-layer architecture with enhanced defence-in-depth
attributes introduced at each layer. The criticality and sensitivity of each system dictate the security
boundaries within Layers 3 and 4. These layers allow data flow only in one direction, toward less-secure
layers, and provide additional protection to critical mission systems with a certain degree of isolation.
All measures and controls must be implemented in a hierarchical fashion in order to be effective [26].
These layers consist of the following components:
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1. Stateful firewall-inspection engines preventing access from untrusted zones. Commercially
available and regularly updated databases preventing from malware infections using
heuristic engines.
2. Use of unidirectional gateways and application proxies to restrict access toward critical and
sensitive layers using adequate instructions. and controls specific to ICS and SCADA systems.
3. Use of IDPSs used transparently in the infrastructure.
4. Auditing and logging security events with appropriate log management and automation and
orchestration of security events.
Recent developments in research explore the adaptation of Software Defined Networks (SDNs)
into ICS and SCADA security. Many legacy protocols, such as ATM and Frame Relay, have
been replaced by MPLS and SDN, and offer increased fault-tolerant transmissions and diversity
in cyberdefence [62]. Traffic can now be more segregated, and data flows can be decomposed to better
map the threat landscape in these environments. Traffic filtering and deep packet inspection (DPI)
are also deployed to prevent unauthorised access to the ICS, although research on compatibility and
interoperability between ICS and firewall operations is still in its infancy. Industrial ICS firewalls
focus on the unique characteristics of ICS protocols and associated data flows that makes them, to
certain degree, ineffective with protocols used in traditional IT environments. Bridging between IT
and ICS communication is often done by dedicated appliances that segregate the two zones with
access control lists independently applied to both. Any forwarding rules are carefully defined and
thoroughly tested with several initiatives published in the public domain, such as IndusCAP-Gate [63].
The orthogonality principle can be applied to the original five-layer model of an ICS, including
assurance control, available with all appropriate mappings introduced in Tables 3 and 4. Although
these mappings are by no means exhaustive, they show how orthogonality could be applied to an ICS
and used as the basis of future research directions and focus. The number of assurance controls is
limited compared to the functional controls for each layer. That constitutes a significant gap even with
applied orthogonality in the traditional concentric model presented by U.S. NRC.
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Table 3. Applying orthogonality to enhance ICS defence-in-depth strategy.
Enhanced Defence-in-Depth Strategy Using Orthogonality
Layer Typical ICS Components Functional Controls Assurance Controls
Network Network devices: modems, routers, firewalls; ICS
communication protocols: Modbus, DNP3; standard
network protocols: TCP/IP; ICS sublayers: device layer,
monitoring and control layer, and management layer.
Vulnerability, risk assessment and treatment plan;
encryption of ICS communication traffic., e.g., NTRU;
encryption of TCP/lP traffic within VPN tunnels; use
of shielded twisted pairs in sensitive areas; physical
security preventing unauthorised access; role-based logical
access control, staff-vetting procedures to minimise
insider attacks; complete ban on removable-storage media;
redundant critical network components for fail-over;
defence in diversity; mitigation against DOS attacks;
secure encryption and authentication of WiFi traffic:
firewalls and unidirectional gateways for segregation; port
blocking on network switches; establishment of DMZ
between ICS and corporate network: VPNs terminate in
DMZ; use of honeypots and honeynets.
Testing Environments: HIT1, VSCADA, NSTB, etc.; routine
inspections and audit of access and error logs; use
of biometrics to validate access; data-integrity checks;
routine inspections of events and threat logs on firewalls;
routine inspection of logs on honeypots and honeynets;
intrusion detection and prevention; trusted network
protection assurance; vulnerability and penetration testing;
senior-management audits.
Process MTUs; HMIs; data historian. Vulnerability, risk assessment and treatment plan;
physical security preventing unauthorised access;
staff-vetting procedures to minimise insider attacks;
ICS incident response and decision trees; disaster
recovery and business-continuity planning; dedicated
security team; data historian situated within DMZ;
environmental-control systems.
Testing environments: HIT1, VSCADA, NSTB, etc.;
inspection and audit of access logs; CCTV surveillance
of sensitive areas; use of biometrics to validate
access; routine testing of DR and business-continuity
plans; routine backups of data-historian databases;
senior-management audits.
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Table 4. Applying orthogonality to enhance ICS defence-in-depth strategy (cont.).
Enhanced Defence-in-Depth Strategy Using Orthogonality
Layer ICS Typical Components Functional Controls Assurance Controls
Hardware IEDs: sensors, relays, actuators, microprocessors,
microcontrollers; RTUs; PLCs; MTUs.
Vulnerability, risk assessment, and treatment plan; in-depth
auditing of designers, manufacturers, and supply chain of all
hardware; defence in diversity; physical security preventing
unauthorised access; screening to prevent electromagnetic
emanations; staff-vetting procedures to minimise insider attacks;
redundant critical components for fail-over.
Testing environments: HIT1, VSCADA, NSTB., etc.;
testing IEDs for hardware trojans; inspection and audit
of access logs; CCTV surveillance of sensitive areas;
asset tracking; trusted computing platform assurance;
senior-management audits.
Firmware IEDs: sensors, relays, actuators, microprocessors,
microcontrollers, etc.; servers and computer BIOS.
Vulnerability, risk Assessment and treatment plan; physical
security preventing unauthorised access; staff-vetting procedures
to minimise insider threat; confidentiality agreements with
architects and manufacturers; routine firmware patching.
Inspection and audit of access logs; CCTV surveillance
of sensitive areas; testing environments: HIT1, VSCADA,
NSTB, etc.; trusted computing platform assurance; testing
of all firmware patches.
Software PLC programming languages; operating systems. Vulnerability, risk assessment, and treatment plan; physical
security preventing unauthorised access; role-based logical access
control; staff-vetting procedures to minimise insider threat;
complete ban on removable-storage media; routine software
patching; defence in Diversity; reprogramming conducted by
highly trained developers; antimalware software.
Testing environments: HIT1, VSCADA, NSTB, etc.;
inspection and audit of access logs; testing of all
software patches; testing for logic errors and bugs; CCTV
surveillance of sensitive areas; intrusion detection and
prevention; trusted data-protection mechanism assurance;
routine data backup; senior-management audit.
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6. Conclusions
There is a great deal of research that needs to be conducted, commencing with finding assurance
controls at each layer to enhance the orthogonality strategy. In addition, real-time detection techniques
need to be improved. Testbeds are another worthwhile research area, as are lightweight encryption
technologies for ICS communication protocols. The confidential sharing of information between
operators is also a subject that would be worthy of research, but it obviously has significant drawbacks
should this information fall into the wrong hands. A standard of trust awarded to manufacturers and
the supply chain might be an idea to limit the potential damage of fabrication attacks. From outside
observations, the exact state of the ICS industry is difficult to determine, but it is probably only a matter
of time before the next major attack is revealed. On the flip-side, the effort to secure systems seems
to be gaining momentum. In this work, we presented a partial articulation of a model that deploys
orthogonality in both functional and assurance controls in ICSs in an attempt to further normalise
the secure integration of these rather legacy-embedded systems with core architectural components
influencing and influenced by the cyber–physical domain.
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